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The North Car6lina Shareholder Protection Act
In the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, the famed and feared Predator
Corporation surveys the scene. Predator is known for taking over undervalued
companies and selling off their assets at a tidy profit. This looks like a good time
for a merger, because the companies Predator is eyeing have experienced a sharp
drop in their share prices.1
Predator's cool and ruthless gaze soon fixes on Lamb Industries. Predator
approaches the Lamb Board of Directors with a merger proposal, but the Lamb
directors, who know a threat when they see one, send Predator on his way.
Predator, however, is not to be put off so easily. If it cannot entice a merger
agreement out of Lamb, it has the cash to buy one. It can make a two-tier
tender offer, purchasing fifty-one percent of Lamb's shares in the first tier, with
the idea that it will become the controlling shareholder in the company and can
then, in the second tier, elect a Board that will recommend shareholder approval
of the merger. As majority shareholder, Predator can also approve the merger.2
Predator's two-tier takeover plan provides a distinct advantage for a suitor
corporation, allowing it to buy the votes it needs for a merger in the first tier. It
will have to pay a premium for these shares, because they transfer control, but
when the bidder is in a position to approve a merger, it can buy out the remain-
ing shareholders at a lower price and recover the premium. 3 The two-tier ap-
proach, however, has distinct dangers for shareholders: although the
shareholders who sell their shares to the acquiring company in the first tier will
profit because they receive part of the control premium,4 the shareholders who
1. See Companies Take Over the Takeover Game from Flashy Raiders, Wall St. J., Jan. 25,
1988, at 1, col. 6 (hostile corporate takeover bids spurred by low prices resulting from market crash).
But see E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2 (1973) ("Per-
haps the most important factor in assessing the vulnerability of a particular company is the price/
earnings ('p/e') ratio of its common stock.").
2. Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two -Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The Valid-
ity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions under Delaware Law, 11 SEc. REG. L. J.
289, 293 (1984); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 297, 330-31 (1974).
3. A two-tier offer with a higher first-step price and lower second-step price is also called a
front-end loaded offer.
How much should Predator offer per share in his tender offer? Lamb shares are now selling for
$15 per share, and there are 300,000 shares outstanding. Fifteen dollars per share is a good price, so
Predator is willing to pay $4.5 million for the company. Because Predator or.ly wants 51% of Lamb,
it should offer $15 per share for 150,001 shares, or $2,250,015.
But those 150,001 shares are worth more than $15 per share, since they will transfer control. So
Predator could offer $17, for a total tender offer of $2,550,017. Does this mean that he will have to
pay more than his budgeted $4.5 million for Lamb? Not if he can later buy out the remaining
shareholders for less than $15 per share. Predator figures he can do this, since he will be in a posi-
tion, as controlling shareholder, to approve a subsequent merger between Predator and Lamb on his
own terms. Predator will offer $13 per share to the minority shareholders in a merger proposal, and
Predator, as majority shareholder, will approve. Even though Predator had to pay a premium for
the first 51% of the shares, it can make up the difference once it is calling the shots.
4. The debate over a shareholder's right to retain the premium he receives for sale of control
has generated a large volume of commentary. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 334. Case law
suggests that courts will allow a shareholder to retain the premium unless it reflects the price paid
for a specific corporate asset corresponding to control. In Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d
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sell in the second tier will not share in the profit, and any protest will be ineffec-
tual5 because the acquirer controls the company.6 In response to the danger of
unfair treatment of minority shareholders in a two-tier takeover, Congress and
the Securities Exchange Commission have explored the possibility of protecting
shareholders, 7 and some states have enacted statutes mandating fair treatment of
minority shareholders.8
The North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act (the Act)9 was ratified in
1987 in response to the attempted takeover of Burlington Industries, a Delaware
Corporation with less than half of its employees and assets in North Carolina. 10
The General Assembly passed the Act with remarkable speed and without hear-
ings.11 As a result, the bill did not receive the attention it otherwise might have,
and both the operation and significance of many of its provisions are unclear. In
addition, although its title proclaims an interest in protecting shareholders, and
its provisions dictate various formulas for determining a fair price in a two-tier
takeover, the Act had the immediate aim of forestalling the Burlington Indus-
tries takeover. 12 The unsurprising result is that the Act is as much an antitake-
over act as it is a shareholder protection act.
This Note outlines the state and federal protections provided for sharehold-
ers in two-tier takeovers before the passage of the Act, indicating the inadequa-
cies that have led to the need for further protective legislation. It then plots how
Cir. 1955), a rare case in which the court was willing to tie a premium to a specific asset, the share-
holders were not allowed to retain the premium. In that case a purchaser bought a controlling
interest in a steel company in order to assure himself a steady supply of steel during the Korean War,
when steel was rationed. Id. at 178. The court reasoned that the premium purchased more than
general control of the steel company. In addition it purchased a supply of steel the purchaser could
not have obtained otherwise. Id.
5. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text for discussion of traditional shareholder reme-
dies in this situation.
6. Because of the possibility of this result, shareholders are likely to be stampeded into tender-
ing their shares when a partial tender offer is made, for fear of losing out in the second tier. They are
likely to tender even if they are unsatisfied with the price if they believe the tender offer will be
successful.
7. See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1987; SEC ADVISORY COM-
mrrrEE ON TENDER OFFERS, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1028, Extra Edition July 15, 1983. Both
the proposed legislation and the SEC Advisory Committee report adhere to the basic neutrality of
the Williams Act as discussed infra note 27 and accompanying text. See Advisory Committee Re-
port, id. at 9; 197 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, 2 ("actual legislation is likely to be limited to
marginal changes in the Williams Act and fundamental decisions will be left to the SEC, state legis-
latures and the marketplace.").
8. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-
43 (Bums Supp. 1987); MD. CORPS & ASS'NS CODE §§ 3-602, 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
9. An Act to Amend the Business Corporation Act to Provide for the Protection of Public
Shareholders of North Carolina Organized Corporations from being Coerced by Certain Business
Combination Practices and to be Designated the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, ch. 88,
1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 70 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80 (Cum. Supp. 1987)).
10. Other states enacting takeover statutes "at the direct request of large local companies
threatened by outside takeovers" include Minnesota, Massachusetts, Washington, Wisconsin and
Arizona. Welch, States Checkmate Corporate Raiders, ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 1988) 14.
11. Hazen, State Antitakeover Legislation-The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 77, 79 n.12 (1988).
12. See An Act to Amend the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, ch. 124, 1987 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1. The Preamble to this Act, which brought Burlington Industries under the purview of
the Shareholder Protection Act, speaks of the purpose of the act entirely in terms of protecting the
state and local tax bases, employees, and unrelated businesses in the state. Id. at 1.
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the Act works, noting certain ambiguities in the Act's requirements and the
implications of the various provisions for determining the prices to be paid
shareholders for their shares. Finally, the Note shows that even though the indi-
vidual provisions of the Act have the ostensible purpose and effect of protecting
shareholders, the most important requirements are carefully constructed to frus-
trate takeovers. First, the Act undermines the strategy underlying the two-tier
takeover. Second, it neutralizes one of the leading motives for a merger, the
benefit to a purchaser of acquiring a company with a low price/earnings ratio.1 3
The Note concludes by urging recognition that the Act does not merely regulate
takeovers, but severely inhibits them. The General Assembly may decide that
virtual prohibition is the approach it wants to take, but it has yet to give this
exceedingly complex issue the kind of attention and calm deliberation it
requires. 14
State corporation laws have traditionally recognized that shareholder inter-
ests are fundamentally implicated in a merger and must be protected. The law
has provided such protection by providing for shareholder ratification of merg-
ers15 and, for shareholders who dissent from the merger, the right to receive
"fair value" for their shares.1 6 In the context of the front-end loaded two-tier
takeover, however, these protections lose their effectiveness. Shareholder ratifi-
cation of a merger is meaningless if the suitor company controls enough votes to
ensure approval. But even when the suitor has not purchased the statutorily
required number of- shares to guarantee approval, the suitor who controls the
board of directors has control of the proxy machinery and can use proxy solici-
tations to marshal a disproportional number of votes. As a result, "the ability of
the stockholders to exercise their voting rights with real effect . .. is slight."' 17
The appraisal remedy for dissenting shareholders is likewise inadequate to
protect the minority shareholder when a two-tier takeover forces an unwanted
merger on them. Shareholders dissent because they believe the terms of a merger
are not as favorable as they would like. In a cash-out merger, in which the
majority purchases all shares from public shareholders, they will have to accept
whatever terms are approved by the controlling shareholder or resort to the
13. The price/earnings ratio is the price per share divided by earnings per share.
14. This Note will not address the constitutionality of the Act, though that is an issue deserving
of attention. The General Assembly apparently recognized the difficulty when it included two provi-
sions that serve only to protect the Act against invalidation under a constitutional challenge.
Section 55-79.1, entitled "Conflict of laws," limits the extraterritorial applicability of the Act:
If any jurisdiction under the laws of which a foreign corporation is organized adopts any
law containing provisions that are expressly inconsistent with the provisions of this Article
as applicable to such foreign corporation, the provisions of this Article shall be inapplicable
to such foreign corporation to the extent necessary to resolve such inconsistency.
Id
Section 55-80, entitled "Severability," provides that any provision in the Act declared invalid
will be deemed severable from the remainder of the Act if the Act "can be given effect without the
invalid provision .. " Id.
15. E.g., DEL. STAT. ANN. § 251(c) (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108(b) (1982); REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § I 1.03(b)(2) (1984).
16. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(b) (1982).
17. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 300. The SEC Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 7, at 23, estimates that 20% share ownership is sufficient to confer control.
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appraisal remedy. As Professors Brudney and Chirelstein note, "the object of
appraisal is to give dissident stockholders an opportunity to avoid the conse-
quences of merger, not to undo the merger or to press directly for better
terms."1 8 Shareholders may well desire not to be in the position they were in
before, which is where the appraisal remedy will attempt to place them, 19 but to
be in a position in which they can share fully in the gains resulting from the
merger.20 Thus, neither of the traditional protections for shareholders in the
statutory merger context is adequate in a two-tier takeover.
Since 1968, when Congress enacted the Williams Act,2 1 federal securities
regulation has provided additional protection for investors by requiring anyone
seeking to take control of a public issue corporation to disclose his plans, 22 and
also by prescribing a timetable for a tender offer that provides sufficient time for
the investor to make a reasoned judgment about the offer. 23 In addition, tender-
ing shareholders may withdraw their shares at any time during the first fifteen
days the offer is effective,24 all shareholders must be paid the same price for their
shares, 25 and the offeror must purchase shares pro rata from all shareholders if
more shares are tendered than the offeror has offered to purchase.26
The Williams Act proceeded on the theory that takeovers might be either
good or bad, depending on their terms, and its regulations sought to be neutral,
neither encouraging nor impeding takeovers. 27 The states, however, soon fol-
lowed with what has come to be known as the "first generation" of takeover
statutes. 28 These statutes abandoned the neutral stance of the Williams Act and
instead gave corporate management the weapons to defeat tender offers whether
they were in the best interests of the shareholders or not.29 The first-generation
statutes address the front end of the two-tier takeover, generally imposing a
18. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 304.
19. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 306. But see Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701,
704 (Del. 1983). This case says that appraisal must include all relevant factors in determining value
of shares, though it is not clear whether such'factors could include forecasts of future gains resulting
from the merger.
20. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 305.
21. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (e),
(f) (1982)). The United States Supreme Court discussed the legislative history of the Act, finding
that it shows the basic purpose of the act to be protection of investors, in Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28-38 (1977).
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1)(West 1981).
23. The offer must remain open for 20 days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1987).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1981).
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(7) (West 1981).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(6) (West 1981).
27. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982); Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regu-
lation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 767, 768 (1971); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in
Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 253 (1983).
28. The Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 left the following
provision intact: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction ... of any State over any
security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1981). This leaves open to the states the option of
passing laws regulating takeovers. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 631.
29. Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 27, at 785. "Thinly disguised as legislation for the protec-
tion of investors, these statutes cannot in any practical sense be viewed as anything more than at-
tempts to protect incumbent management and local industry." Id.
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waiting period between the announcement of the tender offer and the effective
date. According to Aranow and Einhorn, such a requirement "effectively elimi-
nates one of the major advantages of the tender offer technique-that of
surprise." 30
North Carolina participated in the first generation with the Tender Offer
Disclosure Act, enacted in 1977.31 This statute, applying to North Carolina cor-
porations and to companies having their principal place of business and substan-
tial assets in the state,32 requires that tender offers remain open for twenty-one
days, 3 3 and that tendering shareholders be allowed to withdraw their shares "at
any time up to three business days before the termination of the effectiveness of
the tender offer." 34 The act also requires disclosure of pertinent information
about the offeror, including the source of funding for the offer and a "statement
of the purpose... of the tender offer and of any plans existing at the time such
tender offer is made ....
The state schemes were thrown into disarray when the United States
Supreme Court declared an Illinois first-generation takeover statute unconstitu-
tional in Edgar v. MITE Corp.36 The Court held that the Illinois statute "upset
the careful balance struck by Congress" in the Williams Act between target
company and bidder.37 North Carolina's first-generation statute, comparable to
the Illinois statute struck down in Edgar, has never been tested, but one com-
mentator has argued that it is probably unconstitutional under the analysis in
30. Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 27, at 775. The waiting period allows the target company to
communicate with its shareholders before the acquirer can present its case. It may also give time for
the company to offer to purchase its own shares. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 638 n.13 (listing defense strate-
gies capitalizing on delay of tender offer).
31. An Act to Create a New Chapter 78B Concerning Tender Offers, ch. 781, 1977 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1018 (codified in scattered sections N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 (1985)).
32. Id. § 78B-2(12) (defining "Subject company").
33. Id. § 78B-3(1).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 78B-4(4).
36. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Recently, however, the Court has noted that since Edgar was not a
majority decision its "reasoning" is not binding. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107
S.Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987).
37. Id. at 634. The Court specified three ways in which the statute tipped the balance in favor
of management of the target company. First, the statute required the bidder to inform the target
company of its planned tender offer at least 20 days before the effective date of the tender, and it
further required that the offeror refrain from communicating with the shareholders in any way dur-
ing this period. ILL. Rlv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54.11, 137.54.B, 137.54.A (1979) (repealed
1983). The Court held that these provisions frustrate "the objectives of the Williams Act" by pro-
viding "incumbent management with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detri-
ment of the stockholders who will not have an offer before them during this period." Edgar, 457
U.S. at 635. Second, the statute gave authority to the Illinois Secretary of State to call a hearing
"with respect to any tender offer," and the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57.A, 137.57.B. Since the Secretary could delay completion
of the hearing indefinitely, the provision provided a way for an official to defeat the offer. The
provisions were therefore in conflict with the Williams Act. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 636-39. Finally, the
Illinois statute provided that the Secretary of State could disapprove of the offer if he adjudged it
unfair. ILL. REv. STAT. para. 137.57.E. This conflicted with the intent of Congress, as embodied in
the Williams Act, "for investors to be free to make their own decisions." Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639.
In addition to the destruction of the balance between bidder and incumbent management, the
Court held the statute unconstitutional as "a direct restraint on interstate commerce," having "a
sweeping extraterritorial effect." Id. at 642.
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that case. 38
After Edgar, states began exploring new ways to regulate takeovers, con-
centrating on the two-tier takeover. The statutes enacted were initially of three
main types,3 9 with a fourth variation emerging more recently.4° The most popu-
lar approach has been the fair price statute,41 which generally requires that the
offeror pay shareholders in the second step of a takeover the highest price previ-
ously paid for any shares.42 Another kind of statute, often called a control share
acquisition statute, gives shareholders the power to decide whether an entity
purchasing large numbers of shares may vote them.43 A third type of statute
confers redemption rights on shareholders when an acquirer gets at least thirty
percent of a company's shares. 44 A more recent variation is probably destined
to become the dominant type, because it has been adopted, in slightly different
forms, by Delaware and New York.4 5 This approach bans second-tier mergers
for a specified number of years after the initial tender offer.
North Carolina's Shareholder Protection Act could fairly be described as a
"shotgun" fair price statute, providing not one but three ways of determining
the price a bidder must pay shareholders in the second tier of a takeover. In
addition, the Act sets requirements for the bidder's conduct after the first tier of
purchases but before the second, sets some limitations on the financing of a take-
over, and establishes rules for submission of the proposal for merger or other
combination to the shareholders.
The Act applies to corporations organized under the laws of North Caro-
lina4 6 or foreign corporations having a substantial presence in the state.47 The
38. Note, Securities Regulation: The Validity of North Carolina's Tender Offer Disclosure Act,
19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 267, 284, 288 (1983).
39. Pinto, Takeover Statutes" The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 473, 478-83 (1987); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REv. 111, 115-17 (1987); Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L.
REv. 709, 725 (1987) [hereinafter "State Competition Debate"].
40. Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203,
211-12 (1987).
41. Romano, State Competition Debate, supra note 39, at 725.
42. Id. See the Illinois and Maryland statutes for examples of highest price provisions. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 7.85B. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS & ASs'NS CODE § 3-
603(b)(1)(iii) (1985).
43. Id. North Carolina passed a control share acquisition statute in 1987. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-90 to -98.1 (Cur. Supp. 1987). Under this act, shareholders can deny voting rights to
control shares, id. § 55-94, and they may redeem their shares at a fair value if one investor purchases
a majority of the outstanding shares in the company. Id. § 55-95.
44. Id. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
45. The Delaware statute imposes a three-year delay on business combinations between corpo-
rations and interested shareholders. The moratorium does not apply to friendly takeovers, to inter-
ested shareholders owning 85% or more of the corporation's shares, or to combinations approved by
two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders (voting by proxy not allowed). Del. Code § 203, Busi-
ness Combinations With Interested Shareholders, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 209 (Feb. 5, 1988).
The New York statute imposes a five-year moratorium on business combinations unless the purchase
of a controlling interest was approved at the time of purchase by the corporation's board. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75(b)(3a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
47. Id. § 55-75(b)(3a)(2). Specifically, the foreign corporation falling within the terms of the
Act is one
(i) which has its principal place of business in this State, (ii) which at the end of each of its
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Act includes an exemption, however, for corporations not having "shares of any
class, or series, listed' on a national securities exchange or held of record by more
than 2,000 shareholders at the time such other entity acquired in excess of ten
percent (10%) of the voting shares .... -48 The Act also exempts corporations
that have opted out of its protections. 49 Corporations in existence at the time
the Act was passed must have opted out within ninety days from the effective
date of the Act, and corporations may opt out by including a provision to that
effect in their articles of incorporation. 50 No provision in the Act forecloses to
an existing corporation the option of setting up a new corporation with opt-out
provisions, then merging into that corporation before proceeding with the com-
bination.5 1 This would, however, be contrary to the spirit of the Act.
The enforcement mechanism in the statute is the "Voting requirement"
provision.52 This section provides that any "business combination" 53 with an
entity owning more than twenty percent of the voting shares of the corporation
must be approved by ninety-five percent of the voting shares.54 If a takeover is
contested at all, no party could possibly muster ninety-five percent of the votes.
Even without a contest the ninety-five percent threshold will be elusive because
last two fiscal years and at the end of its most recent fiscal quarter has more than forty
percent (40%) of domestic fixed assets in this State, (iii) more than ten percent (10%) of
the beneficial owners of the voting stock of which are resident in this State; and (iv) of
which more than forty percent (40%) of the persons employed by such corporation in the
United States are resident in this State.
Id. Although the extraterritorial reach of the Act was part of the originally passed statute, the
statute originally covered corporations with 50% of their assets and 50% of their employees in the
state. Nine days after the Act was enacted, the General Assembly amended it to lower the required
percentages to 40%. An Act to Amend the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, ch. 124,
1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-79 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-79 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
50. Id. The Act also exempts any agreements for business combinations existing as of April 23,
1987. Id.
51. Hazen, supra note 11, at n.12.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-76 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
53. The Act defines "business combination" to include
any merger or consolidation of a corporation with or into any other corporation, or the sale
or lease of all or any substantial part of the corporation's assets to, or any payment, sale or
lease to the corporation or any subsidiary thereof in exchange for securities of the corpora-
tion of any assets (except assets having an aggregate fair market value of less than five
million dollars ($5,000,000)) of any other entity.
Id. § 55-75 (b)(1).
54. The entity seeking the merger cannot escape the requirements of the Act by reducing its
holdings below 20% "if, as of the record date for the determination of shareholders entitled to notice
of and to vote on the business combination, the other entity is an 'affiliate' of the corporation." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-78(a) (Cum. Supp. 1987). The usage in this provision is confusing, since "corpora-
tion" could mean either the target corporation in the takeover or a corporate transferee from the
"other entity." The context suggests that the latter interpretation is the correct one, though this is
clearly a case of hasty draftsmanship, since the transferee from the other entity will not necessarily
be a corporation. Another provision in this section supports the interpretation that the bidder can-
not avoid the requirements of the Act by transferring to a third entity with which it is an affiliate.
Section 55-78(c)(ii) grants power to the continuing directors of the target corporation to determine
whether "an other entity is an 'affiliate' or 'associate' of another .... " Id. § 55-78(c)(ii).
Section 55-75(b)(6) says that "affiliate" is used as defined in the 1934 Exchange Act, which
defines "affiliate" as "a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, con-
trols, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (1987).
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of shareholder inertia and because shares and shareholders may be lost. Thus,
the voting requirement effectively forces business combinations to comply with
the other provisions of the Act which render the voting requirement
inapplicable.
A bidder can escape the voting requirement, first, by complying with the
fair price requirements of section 55-77. The statutorily mandated price can be
calculated in three ways.55 The first might be called a highest premium price.
The statutory formula compares (1) the highest price previously paid for any
shares with (2) the market price at the time of the bidder's first purchase, and
requires that the price paid in the second tier reflect a similar premium with
respect to the market price "immediately prior to the announcement of such
business combination." 56 That is, the proportional premium previously paid
must be paid in the second tier, but this time the premium is a proportion of the
later market price rather than the price at the time of the first purchase.
The second price calculation is a straight highest price requirement.5 7 The
price must be "not less than the highest per share price (including brokerage
commissions and/or soliciting dealers' fees) paid by such other entity in acquir-
ing any of its holdings of the shares of corporation's [sic] common stock."'58
The third price calculation is more complex, combining the earnings of the
corporation with the price/earnings ratio of the bidder.59 The statutory formula
requires that the price per share be no less than the earnings per share of the
target company multiplied by the price/earnings multiple of the bidder. For
analysis, the formula can be written:6°
(EPS)T SP
1 (EPS)B
If the earnings per share of the two companies are the same, the p/e formula will
produce a price equal to the acquirer's share price:
SP SPx -
I (EPS)B 1
55. The bidder would have to offer the highest price indicated by any of the three calculations,
since that is the only way it could satisfy fully the requirements of § 55-77.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1987). The statute expresses this as a ratio that
can be rendered: X/MPA = HP/MPI, where X = required price, MPA = market price at time of
announcement, HP = highest price paid, and MPI = market price at time of first purchase. Solv-
ing the equation, the bidder would offer a price of
HP
X MPA
MP1
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75 (2)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
58. Id.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75(2)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1987). The bid price must be
not less than the earnings per share of the corporation's common stock for the four full
consecutive fiscal quarters immediately preceding the record date for the solicitation of
votes on such business combination, multiplied by the then price/earnings multiple, if any,
of such other entity as customarily computed and reported in the financial community.
Id.
60. (EPS)T = target corporation's earnings per share; SP = bidder's share price; (EPS)B =
bidder's earnings per share.
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If the target's earnings per share are greater than the acquirer's, the p/e formula
will produce a correspondingly higher share price. 61
Satisfaction of the price requirements, however, will not by itself liberate a
bidder from the ninety-five percent voting provision. The Act also places re-
strictions on the bidder's conduct in the period between the threshold purchase
of an interest greater than twenty percent and the time of the second tier
merger.62 The restrictions apply even if the bidder came under the purview of
the Act at a time it was not contemplating a takeover. First, the bidder
shall have taken steps to ensure that the corporation's board of direc-
tors included at all times representation by continuing directors pro-
portionate to the outstanding shares of the corporation's common
stock held by persons not affiliated with the other entity (with a contin-
uing director to occupy any resulting fractional board position) .... 63
The Act does not, however, indicate what "steps" the bidder must "have taken."
Given a weak reading, it could mean that the bidder must not have attempted to
control a number of directorships disproportionate to its ownership. A stronger
reading could require the bidder to play a more active role in ensuring represen-
tation on the board by "continuing directors," 64 which could include nominat-
ing directors or soliciting proxies for continuing directors.65
The second conduct restriction prohibits the bidder from acquiring "any
newly issued shares of the corporation's capital stock .... "66 This provision
could become important if the target corporation issues new shares in order to
dilute the proportional ownership of the acquirer. 67 The acquirer would have to
match any new issues with purchases of shares already issued just to maintain its
proportional ownership.
61. The price will increase in a direct, rather than a geometric, proportion to the increase in the
target's earnings per share over the bidder's.
62. For provisions governing the bidder's conduct, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-77(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1987). This section includes one requirement that does not govern bidder's conduct, § 55-
77(3)(ii). The requirement is discussed infra at notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75(3)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
64. A "continuing director" is
a person who was a member of the board of directors of the corporation elected by the
public shareholders prior to the time that the other entity acquired in excess of ten percent
(10%) of the voting shares of the corporation, or a person recommended to succeed a
continuing director by a majority of the continuing directors.
Id. § 55-75(b)(3). It is worth noting that continuing directors do not include directors elected during
the period between the bidder's purchase of greater than ten percent of the voting shares and its
purchase of the remaining shares that trigger the Act. As a result, any directors elected, for exam-
ple, under a cumulative voting system by the bidder during the interim period could not qualify as
continuing directors, even though they were elected before the Act became applicable.
65. The ambiguities here could be irrelevant in practice, since shareholders could, under the
Control Share Acquisition Act, deny the bidder the right to vote its shares in proportion to its actual
ownership. If the bidder acquires 20% of the voting shares, he may under certain conditions be
unable to vote the shares without shareholder approval. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(3), 55-94
(Cum. Supp. 1987).
66. Id. § 55-77(3)(iii). The bidder may, however, acquire new issues "upon conversion of any
convertible securities acquired... prior to obtaining a twenty percent (20%) interest or as a result of
a pro rata stock dividend or stock split .... " Id.
67. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 1, at 247-49 (dilution as defense to hostile
takeover).
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However, the final conduct requirement prohibits the acquirer from buying
"any additional shares of the corporation's outstanding common stock, or secur-
ities convertible into common stock, except as part of the transaction which
resulted in the other entity acquiring its twenty percent (20%) interest .... ,,68
The effect of this provision is that if the target company issues new shares, the
bidder may not respond in any way to maintain its proportional ownership and
control.
In addition to share price and bidder's conduct, the Act regulates the fi-
nancing of the takeover, though the terms by which it does so are oblique. If the
bidder is to escape the ninety-five percent vote requirement, it may not have
"received the benefit, directly or indirectly, except proportionately with other
shareholders, of any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges, or other financial
assistance or tax credits provided by the corporation .... ."69 The bidder might
have various reasons to use financial assistance from the corporation, but the
most relevant in the takeover context is likely to be assistance in financing the
takeover itself.70 Thus, the provision has the effect of prohibiting leveraged
buyouts or any variant in which the corporation guarantees the loans used for
the purchase and the corporation's funds are used to repay the loans. 7 1
A third set of provisions places restrictions on the acts of the board of direc-
tors during the period between the first and second tiers of the takeover. If the
bidder is to avoid the ninety-five percent voting requirement, there must not
have been any "reduction in the rate of dividends payable on the corporation's
common stock, except as may have been approved by a unanimous vote of its
directors .... ,,72 A similar provision prohibits "any major change in the corpo-
ration's business or equity capital structure unless by a unanimous vote of the
directors . . .,73
Finally, the Act prescribes the procedure for approving the merger or other
combination. 74 The target board must mail to the public shareholders a proxy
statement, in accordance with the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act,7 5
to solicit shareholder approval of the combination. 76 The continuing directors
must be given access to the proxy statement, and any one of them may ex-
press an opinion "as to the advisability or inadvisability of the business
combination."'77
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-77(3)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
69. Id. § 55-77(4)(i).
70. The Maryland fair price statute is more explicit than the North Carolina Act, prohibiting
loans and guarantees "whether inanticipation of or in connection with such business combination or
otherwise." MD. CORPS & Ass'NS CODE § 3-603(b)(5) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
71. Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1039, 1040 (1987).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-77(3)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1987). As this provision is worded, there may
be some room for incumbent management, if the bidder controls less than a majority of the voting
shares, to sabotage a takeover by reducing the dividend rate by a less than unanimous vote.
73. Id. § 55-77(4)(ii).
74. Id. § 55-77(5).
75. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West 1981).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-77(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
77. Id. If a majority of the continuing directors agree, the proxy statement may include an
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The title of the Shareholder Protection Act proclaims its ostensible pur-
pose. Given a takeover attempt, the Act will work to the benefit of shareholders.
The price provisions will assure them a share in the control premium. The con-
duct provisions will prohibit manipulations of the company harmful to the inter-
ests of shareholders. At the same time, however, the Act is an antitakeover act,
which means that takeovers will occur less often; this will result in fewer share-
holder opportunities to benefit from sales of control premiums. 78 In fact, it is
not an overstatement to say that the Act is primarily an antitakeover statute, and
that shareholder protection is subordinate to the antitakeover and management
entrenchment function. In addition to the history of the Act, 79 the pricing pro-
visions support this view, because they neutralize two of the leading elements of
an attractive two-tier takeover. The Act undermines both the bidder's strategy
and the target's characteristics, rendering takeovers either cost-prohibitive or
unattractive. The highest premium provision not only prohibits differential
treatment of shareholders, regardless of fairness to second-tier shareholders, but
it makes the bidder unable to anticipate with any certainty the ultimate cost of
the takeover, because the statutory price may be driven up by the market price.
The price/earnings pricing formula neutralizes the effect of a target company's
low price/earnings ratio, thus making it a less attractive merger candidate. In
enacting the statute, the General Assembly has rejected the "neutrality" ap-
proach of the Williams Act 80 and adopted, with apparently little deliberation,
the theory that two-tier takeovers are harmful and should be regulated out of
existence.
Under the North Carolina Act, the highest premium formula81 may pro-
duce a statutory price higher than any previous highest price if the market value
at the time of the announcement of the combination has risen from the market
value at the time of the bidder's first purchase of the corporation's shares.82
Because the formula relies on a fluctuating market price, a bidder will be handi-
capped in trying to determine how much to offer per share in the original tender
offer. The initial offer must be set in light of the total contemplated acquisition
price. But because the bidder cannot anticipate with any certainty the market
opinion from "a reputable investment banking firm as to the fairness (or not) of the terms of the
business combination to the remaining public shareholders .. " Id.
78. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 698 (1982)
("Any attempt to require sharing simply reduces the likelihood that there will be gains to share.").
79. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
82. Since the price is
HP
X MPA
MPI
(see supra note 56) any excess of HP over MP1 will produce a quotient greater than one, which,
multiplied by the current market price, will produce a statutory price greater than the current mar-
ket price. If the current market price is greater than MPI, the statutory price will be greater than
any previous highest price.
One effect of the highest premium formula will be that shareholders who did not tender or who
were "pro-rated out" in the first tier may benefit if the tender offer has increased the market price.
Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 296.
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price after his initial offer, the price in the initial offer becomes a gamble in
which the stakes are too large. The highest premium price may not be a factor
in a takeover under the Act if the share price has fallen sufficiently since the
bidder's first purchase. However, the more likely fact situation is that the share
price will have risen since the first purchase, especially when the Act guarantees
a premium to shareholders that rises proportionally to any increase in the mar-
ket price.8 3
The Act further destabilizes the bidder's position because it does not place
any time limitations on the share purchases to be used in the highest premium
calculation. As a result the benchmark market price could be a price from many
years before when the bidder made a purchase of shares without any intention of
initiating a takeover. By contrast, both the Maryland and Illinois takeover stat-
utes, similar in many respects to North Carolina's, set a two-year window for
locating the highest price previously paid and the market price at the time of the
first purchase.8 4 The two-year restriction makes the highest premium calcula-
tion more rational, because its results should for the most part reflect premiums
paid as part of the takeover scheme. North Carolina's approach could defeat the
intent to require payment of a highest premium by introducing figures periph-
eral to the takeover.
On the one hand, the highest premium formula destabilizes the bidder's
position. On the other, the price/earnings formula completes the antitakeover
scheme by undermining the target's attractiveness as a merger candidate.85 The
p/e formula is ostensibly a shareholder protection provision, and an analysis of
the formula will profit from an understanding of its significance for sharehold-
ers. The provision embodies a novel and intriguing concept, seeking to reflect
the value of the company rather than the vagaries of the market, and the share
price the formula generates should give the public shareholder an amount corre-
sponding to the earning power of the company. This approach has an advantage
over formulas based on market price because the company's earnings are not as
liable to distortion resulting from the takeover bid as is the market price of the
shares.8 6 In the p/e formula, the bidder's share price is important, but that
figure is not likely to be as volatile as the target's share price, which does not
figure at all in the formula.
To see how the p/e formula affects both purchasers and target sharehold-
ers, consider our fictional Predator's attempted takeover of Lamb Industries.8 7
Suppose Predator has a price/earnings multiple of twenty, while Lamb's is a
more conservative ten. According to Aranow and Einhorn, the leading charac-
83. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 360-
65 (1980) (empirical study showing increase in value of shares following announcement of successful
tender offer):
84. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85B. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS & ASS'NS
CODE § 3-603(b)(1)(iii) (1985).
85. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
86. On the other hand, the target company's earnings may be distorted if the company has
taken costly defensive measures in response to the takeover attempt.
87. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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teristic of an attractive takeover target is that its p/e ratio is lower than the
bidder's, especially if the bidder's is inflated. By merging with a company carry-
ing a lower p/e ratio, Predator can lower its p/e ratio without actually increas-
ing its earnings.88
In order to isolate the effect of differing p/e ratios under the formula, as-
sume that the shares of Predator and Lamb are selling at the same price, $20.
Lamb's earnings are then $2 per share. The statutory formula requires that
Predator's price/earnings ratio, 20/1, be multiplied by $2. The price Predator
will have to pay for each share of Lamb is thus $40, double the market price.
The rationale of the formula becomes clear if it is applied to a share exchange.
In a share exchange, Lamb shareholders will receive two shares of Predator for
one share of Lamb. At Predator's 20 to 1 p/e ratio, they will need the two
shares of Predator to earn the amount one share of Lamb produced at 10 to 1.
The rationale of the provision is less clear, however, in light of the fact that
shareholders may receive a significant windfall if they sell their shares immedi-
ately, or if the formula is used to determine a cash price rather than a share
exchange. The potential extremity of the result intimates that the formula may
have another function.
The "other function" of the p/e formula, the one showing it to be primarily
an antitakeover provision, is to neutralize the business purpose for a bidder's
pursuing a company with a lower p/e ratio. Because the bidder will have to pay
a premium for the higher earning power per share of the target, the bidder's
earnings will be depleted by the purchase to the same degree the purchase would
otherwise boost its earnings power.
A hypothetical will demonstrate how the p/e formula nullifies the effect of
a merger on the bidder's price/earnings ratio, assuming the p/e ratio of the tar-
get is lower than the bidder's. Assume the following facts:
Bidder Target
Share price $10 $10
P/e ratio 20 10
Earnings per share (EPS) $.50 $1
Outstanding shares (OS) 10,000 1,000
Earnings (EPS X OS) $5,000 $1,000
The Act's p/e formula would require issuance of 2,000 shares to the target's
shareholders in a share exchange (the equivalent of $2 per share, or 1 X 1/.50),
so the bidder would have 12,000 shares outstanding after the merger. Assuming
the two companies perform after the merger just as they did in the preceding
year, the bidder's earnings would be $6,000 ($5,000 + $1,000). The earnings
per share would thus remain at $.50, unchanged from the level before the
merger. The advantage to the bidder of the target's low p/e ratio has been offset
to the penny.
88. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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The debate over the proper aims and methods of takeover regulation is re-
markably rich and voluminous. Commentators dispute not only how to regu-
late,8 9 but more importantly the prior question of whether to regulate.90 The
debate demonstrates that the problem of takeover regulation requires a reevalua-
tion of the Williams Act, with its neutrality approach, 9 1 and a reexamination of
the implications of shareholding as the means of ownership of the corporation.
92
The approaches to regulation are so many and so various that this Note
cannot pretend to carve out the position North Carolina should adopt. Virtually
any position the state adopts, whether it encourages takeovers or forestalls them,
will be subject to searching and arguably "correct" criticism. The difficult issues
involved will only be resolved by a historical development of takeover regulation
that seriously addresses the pertinent issues. Consensus will not emerge from
the lucubrations of academic commentators. It will only come from legislative
action and the consequent results in the marketplace. But legislative action
must be deliberate, consulting a broad range of the affected constituency, and it
must proceed with a coherent sense of the proper aims of regulation.
North Carolina has not been alone in enacting a takeover statute without
hearings and over the objections of the state corporation law bar.9 3 But good
company in this case should provide no comfort. The General Assembly must
squarely face the fact that the Shareholder Protection Act is a strong antitake-
over statute, artfully contrived to undermine bidders' strategies and to render
targets less attractive. This approach to regulation may be the best for all con-
cerned. Or it may not. The state's legislators need to decide this issue in a
deliberate and rational manner.
STUART JOHNSON
89. See, eg., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Take-
overs, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985) (proposal to allow shareholders to tender shares provisionally
and to vote on acceptance of the offer); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2 (disclosure plus fair
price requirements); Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers A Dissenting View and Recom-
mended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225 (1984) (prohibit a range a defensive tactics, prohibit two-tier
offers, impose 120-day waiting period for tender offers to encourage competing offers); Lowenstein,
supra note 27 (require hostile tender offers to remain open for six months).
90. See, eg., Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19
GA. L. REV. 281 (1985) (cost-benefit analysis demonstrates two-tier offers are beneficial and should
not be regulated); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 78, at 698 (regulation not in shareholder inter-
est since it decreases likelihood that there will be gains for shareholders to share); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1161 (1981) (managerial defenses to tender offers should be proscribed, and decision should be
left entirely to shareholders); Liman, Has the Tender Offer Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 687, 707 (1978) ("It is fair, therefore, to rise above the tactics of the [tender offer]
movement, and ask whether the public interest is being served."); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Tar-
get's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980)
(application of business judgment rule to target's consideration of tender offer).
91. Liman, supra note 90, at 707; Lowenstein, supra note 27, at 252.
92. Lowenstein, supra note 27, at 259-62.
93. See Romano, State Competition Debate, supra note 39, at 727 n.51 (Connecticut); Steinberg,
The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 184, 185 (1984) (Pennsylvania).
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